Indonesia’s Gado-Gado Foreign Policy – A Look at Developments Under Prabowo Subianto’s Leadership

There were expectations by many that Indonesia’s foreign policy under President Prabowo Subianto to be more assertive and proactive in assuming a global[1] or at least regional role.[2] However, nearly a year into his presidency, despite numerous high profile state visits, attendance and accession in international forums, there is a growing perception that Indonesian foreign policy lacks clear direction.[3] Much like “Gado-Gado,” a traditional Indonesian dish made of mixed vegetables that is neither a meal nor a snack, the policy appears to be a haphazardly mixed salad that lacks careful preparation and planning.

Despite grand declarations of making Indonesia a leader of the Global South, Prabowo and his government seems to have foreign policies and actions that are disconnected from the regional environment – particularly ASEAN as an institution, while demonstrating a lack of clearly defined national interest in the international stage. 

This article argues that Prabowo Subianto has overly personalized key aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy and its bureaucracy and doctrine, reflecting his persona and imagination, while inadvertently disengaging them from the substantive issues at hand. The pattern suggests that Prabowo often entertains grand narratives that are neither tested by informed advisors nor grounded in a deep understanding of the complexities involved. 

Grand ideas but lacking substance

One notable early example occurred on the international stage when Prabowo presented a four-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2023. Speaking in his capacity as Indonesia’s defense minister, his statement caused confusion because it was neither coordinated with nor aligned with the Foreign Ministry under then – President Joko Widodo.[4] It also drew the ire of the Ukrainian defense minister, who remarked: “It sounds like a Russian plan, not an Indonesian plan… we don’t need this mediator coming with a strange plan.” Additionally, international observers criticized the proposal as unrealistic and perceived it as favoring Russia for not naming it as the aggressor.[5]

In spite of the critical comments from international analysts and diplomats, Prabowo as president-elect stood his ground in the following 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue and insisted that his 2023 cease fire proposal was still necessary as an intermediate solution.[6]

Indonesia refused to sign on to the June 2024 Ukraine peace summit final communique,[7] although it was in line with the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions, which Indonesia voted in favor of in 2022. Indonesia arguably did so to avoid being perceived as excessively aligned with the West. Since the peace summit was a Western-dominated conference, as opposed to the UN General Assembly stage, where Russia is included.[8]

This was in line with Prabowo’s image that he wants to project to the global stage: a world-class leader who is not willing to capitulate to any hegemon. While Prabowo reiterates Indonesia’s free and independent foreign policy doctrine, for stronger impact he had in the past condemned the West referring to them as colonizers.[9] 

His strong anti-Western-imperialist rhetoric seems to have subsided after his makeover in the last election that brought him to the presidency. Nevertheless, “the spiel” still emerges, often when there is a need to deflect criticism or project firmness. During nationwide protests against revisions to military law, which many feared could expand military involvement in the bureaucracy, Prabowo accused foreign-funded NGOs and external powers for sowing discord in Indonesia.[10]

Prabowo has also shown a tendency to depart from established patterns, introducing new rhetoric and proposals that sometimes emerge suddenly and without clear indications of careful planning. In December 2024, he sought to reinforce his image as a statesman on the global stage at the 11^th summit of the Developing Eight (D-8) in Cairo. There, he emphasized the need for greater unity in the Muslim world to confront oppression and division, subtly alluding to Western double-standards. This positioning of Indonesia as a potential leader in the Muslim world continued in his various engagements in Turkey and at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit, in 2025.[11]

In practical terms, however, the idea has often fallen short when he attempted to translate it into concrete action. Prabowo’s speeches during his Middle Eastern country tours, he expressed Indonesia’s willingness to play a role in helping end Israel’s military operations in Gaza and even suggested admitting thousand evacuees in need of medical care.[12] The proposal drew controversy both at home and abroad. Critics argued that it risked aligning with Israel and Trump’s roadmap to expel the Gazans and transform the area into a “Riviera of the Middle East.” Additionally, critics pointed out the absence of careful consideration of the logistic and diplomatic challenges such a plan would entail if it carried out.[13]

The most glaring in these gestures is the lack of comparable attention to issues closer to home, where Indonesia could actually act more effectively and with immediate impact. While willing to play the Islamic card in a high profile case such as Gaza, Prabowo appeared less receptive when Rohingya refugees arrived in Aceh during the 2024 election, and at times even affirming anti-Rohingya sentiment.[14]

Fiery rhetoric but no ideology

The assertive persona, often peppered with anti-Western jargon, appears more performative than ideological, notably when faced with threatening tariffs from the United States, which probably best represents “Western domination” in his speeches.

It was perhaps for the better that Prabowo did not manifest his anti-Western[15] and sometimes incendiary rhetoric[16] when faced with such a one-sided push from Trump’s tariff intimidations. It was particularly jarring how docile Jakarta appeared throughout the tariff negotiation process, especially when seen alongside its BRICS accession and participation in it. It seems Prabowo missed a big opportunity to hedge against US tariff pressures by setting alternative arrangements when joining BRICS. 

Under the pretext of Indonesia’s longstanding doctrine of “free and active foreign policy”, Prabowo’s government decided to have Indonesia join BRICS towards the end of 2024. This marks a departure from the previous administration’s reluctance to enter the association.[17]

This shift from the previous government’s caution about being seen as aligning with anti-Western powers and potentially angering the US[18], was not accompanied by concrete steps toward its stated goals of pursuing broader development opportunities, alternative economic systems, and new source of investments and markets.[19]

Prabowo’s decision to take a political risk by joining BRICS appeared to be more about showmanship[20] focusing on his special privilege and personal interests,[21] rather than presenting a calculated plan to position Indonesia strategically between competing global powers. 

It was a significant missed opportunity to join BRICS, relying solely on normative rhetoric about South-South cooperation[22] without establishing agreements and or collaborative measures to counter the sudden and steep tariffs announced by Trump in April 2025. The ceremonial statements made when Indonesia joined in January were merely repeated during its first attendance as an official BRICS member in July 2025; three months after the tariff threats and just one month before the deadline set by Trump in August.

There were no indications that the government even attempted to identify alternative plans to mitigate potential losses or to counter restricted access to the US market by diversifying its trade portfolio within the new BRICS alliance. Prabowo dispatched several contingents from his Cabinet as negotiators to the US, offering to purchase more energy and gas.[23] However, these concessions seemed ineffective, and instead, the US threatened to impose an additional 10% tariff on BRICS members.[24] 

It is worth noting that the foreign ministry under Prabowo has been inattentive of its structure and were caught unprepared when facing such high-stakes negotiations. It has left the ambassadorial seat in Washington vacant since the last ambassador, Rosan Roeslani, was first appointed as vice minister of state-owned enterprises in 2023, and then appointed as Minister of Investment in Prabowo’s cabinet. The administration had overlooked multiple vacant ambassadorial posts before rushing the replacements to the parliament for approval in July 2025.[25]

Jakarta was then scrambling to renegotiate and sent another delegation to Washington.[26] Later, it claimed there would be a delay in the tariff implementation while negotiations were ongoing, as reported by AntaraNews on July 14[27]. Unexpectedly, Trump seemed to unilaterally announce on July 15 that a deal had been made with Indonesia.[28] The tariff on Indonesian goods was reduced from 32% to 19%, and full access was granted for U.S. goods into Indonesia. Additionally, Indonesia reportedly committed to purchasing $15 billion worth of U.S. energy, $4.5 billion American agricultural products, and 50 Boeing jets.[29] 

In the end, there are clear indications that this deal was made through a completely one-sided process, with Trump calling Prabowo by the phone while he was on his overseas visit, unaccompanied by any economic advisors, and in agreeing to the deal on the spot.[30] Some reportage observed a rather hesitant Prabowo responding to Trump’s announcement upon his return to Jakarta, insinuating the trade deal as a case of bullying.[31]

Prabowo’s initial reaction was reported as somewhat dissatisfied saying Indonesia will still continue to negotiate the tariffs with the U.S.[32] In the following days, however, the government suddenly changed the narrative, claiming it was a successful negotiation to reduce the tariff to 19%[33] – a “victory” from the government officials celebrating the lowest tariff in the ASEAN.[34]

Here, Prabowo failed to strategically use his foreign policy decisions to join BRICS to constructively push back against the United States’ increasingly autarchic moves.

The gap between Prabowo’s rhetoric and the line of his actions can also be observed in relations with the European Union (EU) and Germany. Prabowo’s anti-Western criticisms were directed at the EU at a forum while still campaigning in 2023. He stated “we no longer need the European Union,” and accusing the West of double standards.[35] This statement was one among his few critical remarks in the context of Indonesia’s contention with the European Union (EU) on Nickel and Palm Oil exports at the World Trade Organization. 

Whereas later as President, Prabowo’s administration advanced cooperation with the European Union (EU) by signing the Indonesia-EU Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEPA).[36] The Foreign Ministry subsequently held a ministerial meeting in August 2025 in Jakarta with German Foreign Minister Johann Wanderphul, during which they agreed among other things, to implement and accelerate the Indonesia-EU CEPA to expand trade and investment. Additionally, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has extended an invitation to President Prabowo for a planned meeting in the second half of 2025.[37]

As seen from these cases, Prabowo is not a reactionary ideologue who responds confrontationally to great power pressure. On the positive side, he shows willingness to cooperate and compromise despite his fiery rhetoric. Unfortunately, thus far, he has fallen short of his projected image as a strategic regional leader capable of organizing and navigating his country and the wider region in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. 

A significant blind spot in the backyard 

The most worrying pattern in Prabowo’s messy foreign policy is the personalization of its apparatus, with directions and actions tied to his subjective whims and interests rather than built upon existing frameworks already in place. The appointment of Sugiono as foreign minister clearly reflects this style. In contrast to the foreign ministry’s long tradition, ASEAN is now overlooked as a cornerstone of policy.[38]

One such clear example of this was when Sugiono skipped the informal ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Bangkok in December 2024 to accompany Prabowo to Cairo for the Development Eight (D-8) Summit discussed earlier in this article. This led to observers to question whether Indonesia is abandoning ASEAN.[39]

Sugiono’s absence from Thailand’s extended ASEAN informal consultations on Myanmar was significant.[40] The contrast could not be starker when compared with his predecessor, Retno Marsudi, who during her tenure as foreign minister engaged in a series of intensive “shuttle diplomacies,” particularly during the Myanmar crisis.[41]

The role of the foreign minister has been further diminished to the point that Indonesia made a potentially colossal mistake in its joint statement with China on 9 November 2024.[42] Sugiono accompanied Prabowo in one of the president’s first overseas visits and high-level meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The meeting resulted in several agreements, including what later became a controversial joint statement on maritime cooperation.[43]

The wordings in the statement on economic development in the “overlapping claims” area of the South China Sea has been perceived as implicitly endorsing China’s nine-dash-lines claim – that goes against what ASEAN member states have consistently refused to acknowledge. It also runs counter to Indonesia’s longstanding legal position, which has firmly rejected the validity of China’s nine-dash line claims. 

The most concerning aspect of this incident is that the president chose to ignore advice on such clearly defined issues. At the same time, the foreign minister appears to act more as a shield than as an adviser, limiting his role in guiding the president toward more informed decisions. There were confirmed reports Indonesian diplomats had tried to warn Prabowo about Indonesia’s established policy on the South China Sea, but he chose to ignore.[44] This left other officials in the foreign ministry scrambling to contain the fallout by issuing clarification statements.[45]

The contrast is striking given Prabowo’s ambition for Indonesia to assume a leadership role, yet his action often overlooks the country’s immediate environment. So far, he has devoted more attention and public statements to distant issues – from the Russia-Ukraine war to the Gaza crisis – while remaining largely absent on pressing regional matters such as the Thailand-Cambodia conflict, the plight of the Rohingya refugees, and Myanmar’s increasingly unstable situation.

Overall, Prabowo’s first year has revealed a foreign policy that resembles a “Gado-Gado” salad. It lacks form and substance, fails to articulate Indonesia’s national interests, and shows little ability or willingness to provide the kind of regional leadership needed to align ASEAN members’ common interests in the face of intensifying great power competition.

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Tobias Basuki is co-founder and Managing Director of Aristoteles Consults. Previously senior researcher at the Jakarta based Center for Strategic and International Relations (CSIS). Prior to that he was director of research at Institut Leimena.

Disclaimer: This published work was prepared with the support of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung. The views and analysis contained in the work are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the foundation. The author is responsible for any liability claims against copyright breaches of graphics, photograph, images, audio, and text used.