Analysis
Indonesia, the third largest democracy in the world, has experienced a vibrant and stable democratic consolidation since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998. However, it is now facing an accelerated downfall – its democratic veins have been drained. Ironically, from the hands of its most lauded progeny.
President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo was dubbed the “New Hope” by the Time magazine after he won his first presidential election in 2014. Jokowi was then seen, quite rightly so, by many as the best product our reformation. He was a commoner, not from the political elites. Rising from the political ladder from humble beginnings in a small town in Central Java, he became the mayor of Solo from 2005-2012 where he won in a landslide victory. He came to prominence due to his diligent and effective governance.
Now, at the end of his second term, Jokowi has fully transformed into the shadowy, feudalistic “Javanese ruler,” concept that has plagued Indonesia’s political culture and hindered the full consolidation of democratic practices based on merit and capability. His image is in a stark contrast to the one he presented at the beginning. Hopefully, with less than two months before he steps down as President, he has managed to do one last maneuver to strangle the veins that support Indonesia’s democratic beating heart. The regional elections, particularly the upcoming Jakarta gubernatorial election in November, are in the spotlight.
While Jokowi has accomplishments, but in consolidating his power and advancing his policies, he has resorted to the tried-and-true-method of cartel politics. This approach involves power sharing and trading with all the political elites at the expense of the greater good. This cancerous pattern was already evident at the beginning of his second term when he appointed Prabowo Subianto, his bitter opponent in two elections, as Minister of Defense.
Soon after, we see an accelerating pace of cabinet appointments, unnecessary vice-ministerial posts, commissioners at state owned companies given to political operators and connected elites rather than professional figures with integrity that the country badly needs. In order to shorten the expanding laundry list of Jokowi’s political maneuvers that have undermined our democratic institutions, we should focus on the 2024 election year, culminating with the regional elections.
An intense political drama led to Jokowi fully endorsing Prabowo Subianto in the February presidential election. As part of the alleged bargain, Jokowi’s eldest son Gibran Rakabuming Raka, was proposed as Prabowo’s vice presidential running mate. To achieve this, they had to circumvent the election law stipulating the minimum age requirement of 40 years old to be able to run for president and vice president. Gibran is only 37 years old. Jokowi’s brother-in-law who is also head of the Constitutional Court (MK) allegedly helped pave the way to alter the law allowing Gibran to run as vice president. Meanwhile, Jokowi’s younger son, Kaesang Pangarep, a twenty-year old snacks entrepreneur took over as chairman to a young political party, the Partai Solidaritas Indonesia or Solidarity Party of Indonesia (PSI), without any prior involvement in the party or any parties. Jokowi’s son-in-law is mayor of Medan the capital of North Sumatra, and will run for governor of the province in the upcoming election.
The 2024 presidential election went to become the most controversial yet least interesting one since Indonesia’s reforms.[1] Allegations of coercion of and by state apparatus, as well as the use of social assistance to garner votes, were documented all over the country. Prabowo-Gibran went on to secure a decisive win in the election against Anies Baswedan (former Jakarta Governor) and Ganjar Pranowo, who was once Jokowi’s protégé in their party, the Indonesian democratic struggle (PDIP).
The continued sweeping and breaking of the pillars of Indonesian democratic foundations did not end there. Undermining the rule of law in order to allow Gibran to run as vice president had become a template. Soon after, Jokowi managed to get the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung/MA) to interpret the election law that effectively pave the way to Kaesang Pangarep to run in the upcoming gubernatorial elections, despite being below the minimum age requirement. The law stipulates a minimum age of 30 years old for candidates in the regional election, while Kaesang is only 29 years old. The MA court’s interpretation stated that the candidate only needs to be 30 years old at the time of inauguration of the elected regional head, thus allowing Kaesang to register as a candidate for the election.
If trampling down the rule of law and manipulating and overwhelming fair electoral processes to place their preferred individuals, power were not drastic enough, one apparently still needs to go further to ensure a continued hold on power even after official terms expire.
In the midst of preparations and shifting dynamics for the upcoming regional elections that will be held simultaneously for the first time for 37 provinces and 508 municipalities and cities — political parties are contending over various positions, especially in key regions like Jakarta. Intense political tension has emerged within the ruling Onward Indonesia Coalition (KIM) between its two largest parties, Gerindra and Golkar. The disagreement over who to nominate in West Java and Jakarta has been a main source of contention.
Amidst this maneuvering, Jokowi, now separated with PDIP, but still needs an institutional power, made a masterful stroke to take control of Golkar from its chairperson, Airlangga Hartarto. On August 12, Airlanga officially announced his resignation. Bahlil Lahadalia, a cabinet minister and known loyalist of Jokowi, was installed as the new chairperson on August 21.
Golkar was the last major party without an “owner” unlike other parliamentary parties. In spite of its shortcomings as party, Golkar had maintained some degree of processes in its decision.[2]
The result of this takeover was getting KIM, the ruling coalition led by Jokowi and Prabowo, was able to push through their preferred candidate, Ridwan Kamil, the former West Java Governor, for the vital Jakarta gubernatorial post. Ridwan Kamil was officially declared as Jakarta gubernatorial candidate on August 19. Previously, Airlangga had insisted that Ridwan Kamil, a member of Golkar, to run for West Java, where he was expected to win.
Although Jakarta is no longer the capital, it is still the de-facto capital of the country with political and economic elites concentrated and invested in the city. That is why the Jakarta election is so crucial. It is viewed as the stepping stone for advancing to national politics and eventually the presidency. Additionally, Jakarta is also a prism for the international community to see Indonesia, thus the ruling government wants to control the city by any means necessary.
This may well be the final blow from the oligarchs to the pillars of Indonesia’s democracy: the regional heads and their elections. In the 1998 reformation, Indonesia had become very decentralized, granting autonomy to the regions. In this behemoth coalition between Jokowi’s outgoing regime and Prabowo’s succession, the ruling coalition attempts to monopolize and get their firm hands on the regions, in particular strategic ones like Jakarta, and the Java provinces, as well as North Sumatra.
The Regional Elections Law requires political party or coalition to secure either twenty percent of the local legislature seats or twenty-five percent of the popular vote from the recent legislative elections. In Jakarta, this amounts to basically a party that needing at least 22 seats in the provincial legislature. The ruling KIM coalition, through its maneuvering, managed to co-opt nearly all the parties to join its gubernatorial ticket, nominating Ridwan Kamil, as candidate dubbed as the KIM-plus coalition.
Anies Baswedan, the recent presidential candidate and Jakarta governor from 2017-2022, suddenly found himself abandoned by the political parties that backed him in the presidential election. The only remaining party left was PDIP, which has only 15 seats. It has several strong candidates for governor from its ranks, including Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, who was a capable governor of Jakarta prior to Anies’ term. Yet, PDIP was left with no potential partner party to form a ticket. Ridwan Kamil polls far behind Anies and Ahok in various surveys, hence, the plots to ensure he runs unopposed against an empty ballot box, or puppet independent candidate.
On August 20, in a surprising decision, the Constitutional Court (MK) ruled that the Regional Elections Law threshold was unconstitutional. In short, they lowered the threshold for a political party to nominate a candidate. Thus, by implication, it allows PDIP the ability to nominate its own candidate in Jakarta this election. In addition, the Constitutional Court also overruled the Supreme Court’s (MA) prior ruling, reaffirming the standard interpretation that a candidate must be at least 30 years old at time of registration.
The ruling coalition made a swift counter move. In the national parliament (DPR), legislators pushed for an expedited revision to the Regional Election Law, aiming to override the two Constitutional Court rulings on candidate nomination requirements. They revision was fast-tracked through the House of Representatives Legislation Body (Baleg) almost overnight. The coalition sought to capitalize on a technicality, revising the law to suit their preference, while ignoring proper jurisprudence and the Constitutional Court’s decision as the guiding framework for their revisions.
This revision, which basically ignored the Court, was leaked to the public and caused a massive uproar in civil society. Social media was blasted with criticism from all segments of society. On August 22, people from all walks of life were on the streets of Jakarta protesting in front of the Parliament. Similar protests also spread to other cities.
The outright manipulations and machinations sparked outrage, testing the limits of what the public will tolerate, even for Jokowi, who maintains a very high approval rating in his leadership as president in various polls.
Jokowi’s capable leadership but Machiavellian political cunning had bled Indonesia’s democracy throughout the years. He regressed his own meritocratic appointments for public posts. He had also reneged on his Mental Revolution (Revolusi Mental) at the beginning of his career to push for politics based on integrity and not nepotism. He undermined the rule of law even corrupting the highest courts in the land to pave the way for his family members and his underlings to hold key positions. He, so far, indirectly managed to finally hijack a political party.
The last straw for Indonesian civil society was the remaining frontier of the pillars of our democratic processes —the election of regional heads. Nevertheless, the speech of the newly minted Golkar party chief, Bahlil Lahadlia, stirs a déjà vu and rouses an ominous feeling. In his acceptance speech as Golkar chairman, Bahlil warns, “Don’t mess with a Javanese King”.[3]
What has happened in Indonesia is not an isolated incident. It is a part of a wider global trend of regressing democratic health, particularly in Southeast Asia where the various democratic governments have been struggling to consolidate their democratic foundations.
In Thailand, the Move Forward Party composed of promising young politicians was disbanded by the Court under an oftentimes criticized law. Similarly, in Indonesia, a party, whose members were once self-proclaimed progressive young politicians of the next generation has become the most vociferous defenders of Jokowi’s damaging blows to democracy.
Prabowo, a former general under the authoritarian Indonesian New Order and son-in-law of Soeharto, who had a dubious past, is set to become the Indonesian president in two months. In an uncanny parallel, the Philippine president is Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., son of Ferdinand Marcos, a former dictator ousted by the People Power in 1986. While neither Bongbong nor Prabowo should be judged by the shortcomings of their fathers, both had benefitted from the excesses of their fathers’ legacies. Yet, we hope that they will turn over a new leaf and avoid repeating the mistakes of their predecessors.
In the Philippines, the alliance between the Marcos and Duterte clans has faltered, threatening the stability of governance. While the alliance between the Jokowi and Prabowo clans may appear fine now, we do hope it remains more stable.
Indonesia’s democracy is far from perfect, but it is arguably the most vibrant democracy in the region. It’s succession of power is much more stable compared to the frequent changes of Prime Ministers in Thailand. Indonesian civil society and media are vigorous, and providing robust checks on the government. Political violence remains low. While the rule of law, although imperfect, it is generally well structured.
However, all these foundations have been rusting rapidly from the splashes of political moves of the self-styled “Javanese Ruler” to solidify his power in the land. We hope these democratic foundations can withstand the increasingly powerful waves of recent challenges.
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Tobias Basuki is Co-founder and Managing Director of Aristoteles Consults. Previously senior researcher at the Jakarta based Center for Strategic and International Relations (CSIS). Prior to that he was director of research at Institut Leimena.
Disclaimer: This published work was prepared with the support of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung. The views and analysis contained in the work are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the foundation. The author is responsible for any liability claims against copyright breaches of graphics, photograph, images, audio, and text used.
