Violence Against Women and LGBTQIA+ Human Rights Defenders in Southeast Asia

Article

In Southeast Asia, speaking out as a woman or LGBTQIA+ activist means navigating a landscape where dissent is systematically penalized. Across the region, human rights defenders face a complex web of online abuse, legal harassment, and deep-seated discrimination, threats that are far from accidental, but rather built into national legal systems and reinforced by dominant social and religious norms.

Grounded in postcolonial feminism and Feminist Security Studies (FSS), this paper explores why the violence directed at these activists must be understood as structural rather than isolated incidents. It breaks down the specific tactics states use to shut down civic engagement, from broad criminal laws and state-backed religious decrees to digital smear campaigns and the co-optation of feminist demands, drawing on case studies from Laos, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore. At the same time, it highlights how Southeast Asian feminist and LGBTQIA+ movements build resilience, coming together through cross-issue coalitions, leveraging international tools like CEDAW, and practicing collective care to keep driving long-term change.

This article is part of web-dossier "Feminist Movements in Southeast Asia"

Feminist activist
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Cyber bullying

In Southeast Asia, human rights defenders pay a disproportionate price for dissent. Whether challenging private actors or state institutions, these activists face a spectrum of physical, structural, and cultural violence. Critically, this hostility is often embedded in the legal framework, reinforced by social norms, and often perpetrated by the very institutions mandated to protect their fundamental rights.

The following section of this paper draws on feminist security studies and a postcolonial lens to explain why violence against activists is structural and how it is experienced differently across gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class, and religion. It will address the landscape of violence against activists, particularly women and LGBTQIA+ individuals across the region, focusing on the restriction of civic space through legal mechanisms, discrimination through laws and religious authority, the escalation of digital violence and online harassment, and the co-optation of feminist movements by the states. This analysis is supported by case studies from Laos, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore. 

This paper concludes by demonstrating how Southeast Asian movements strategically resist oppressive systems through intersectional protest, legal advocacy, the cultivation of regional solidarity, and the practice of collective care to sustain resilience and strength for lasting, systematic change.

Rethinking Violence through a Postcolonial Feminist and Feminist Security Studies (FSS) Lens

Understanding violence against women and LGBTQIA+ activists in Southeast Asia requires expanding conventional security frameworks that center on the state and military threats. Drawing on feminist security studies (FSS), this analysis argues that security must be understood not only at the level of the state but also at the level of the body, the household, the market, and the community.[i] FSS focuses on the everyday insecurities faced by women, LGBTQIA+ people, and other marginalized groups whether a country is at peace or not.[ii] This reframing reveals that, for many activists, the state itself is a source of insecurity, where structural violence and institutionalized bias are used as tools to silence dissent

A feminist postcolonial approach enriches FSS by emphasizing that not all women are oppressed in the same way. It considers not only gender, but also ethnicity, class, culture, sexuality, and religion as intersecting analytical categories that shape the distinct experiences of inequality.[iii] These intersecting identities mean that many human rights defenders and activists face not a single form of oppression, but multiple and overlapping layers of power, including patriarchy, heteronormativity, class hierarchy, racial and ethnic marginalization, and religious conservatism. An intersectional lens is therefore essential for understanding why violence and inequality manifest differently across Southeast Asia's diverse contexts, and why feminist responses cannot follow a single prescribed path.

While this dossier focuses broadly on feminist movements, we use the term comprehensively to encompass social movements that incorporate a gender dimension and advance bodily autonomy and rights. This includes LGBTQIA+ and human rights movements, whose struggles for recognition and safety we understand as inseparable from broader feminist demands. We therefore treat these movements as part of the same political project for the purposes of this analysis, while recognizing that they are distinct movements and that this framing may not be applicable to all contexts.

Data and documentation on LGBTQIA+ activists in Southeast Asia remain significantly limited; as a result, their experiences are underrepresented in this paper relative to those of women activists. This disparity reflects a broader gap in research and policy discourse rather than an editorial choice. Where evidence permits, this analysis deliberately incorporates LGBTQIA+ voices and experiences, treating this inclusion not as an addendum but as an act of visibility in its own right. The exclusion of LGBTQIA+ communities from scholarship and policy constitutes a form of marginalization, and this paper calls for more robust data on the experiences of LGBTQIA+ activists.

Landscape of Violence against Women and LGBTQIA+ Activists

Restrictions on Civic Space through Legal Mechanisms

Across Southeast Asia, states have increasingly weaponized legal system to stifle civic engagement. By exploiting broad and vaguely defined statutes, authorities can reframe legitimate dissent as criminal activity. This environment leaves activists, particularly women and marginalized groups, vulnerable to targeted prosecution and lengthy prison sentences for exercising their rights to expression and assembly.

In the Lao PDR, women activists have been facing the high cost of dissent. Governed by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) under a party system, the State restricts any political expression critical of the government. Women activists, environmental defenders, and migrant workers have been subjected to punitive measures, in violation of international fair trial standards.[iv] 

In March 2016, three Lao migrant workers who had advocated for women’s rights and democracy were arrested by police officers upon their return to Laos from Thailand to renew their passports. They were charged with treason, spreading propaganda, and creating social disorder for making three Facebook posts criticizing the government in relation to alleged corruption, deforestation, and human rights violations, as well as for participating in a peaceful demonstration outside the Lao Embassy in Thailand.[v] They were arbitrarily detained by the government and could be imprisoned for up to 20 years.[vi] Subsequently, in 2019, Houayheuang Xayabouly, a woman and environmental human rights defender, was arbitrarily detained and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for broadcasting on Facebook Live and criticizing the government over corruption.[vii] 

These cases reveal a grim reality: the legal system can function as a tool of political control, using arbitrary detention to neutralize women and LGBTQIA+ human rights defenders and to intimidate any who might follow in their footsteps.

Gender-based Discrimination Through Legal and Religious Mechanisms

Beyond restricting civic space, some states have institutionalized legal repression alongside systemic, gender-based violence. By specifically targeting women and LGBTQIA+ activists, these regimes use the law as a tool of intimidation, aiming to dismantle the collective power of marginalized groups and deter them from exercising their fundamental rights to freedom expression and assembly.

Since the 1980s, women and LGBTQIA+ activists’ organizations in Malaysia have functioned as shelters for women from domestic abuse and providing counseling, legal assistance, and advocacy.[viii] However, women’s and LGBTQIA+ movements encounter diverse challenges depending on their ethnic and religious backgrounds. For example, in 2014, the Fatwa Committee of the State of Selangor issued a fatwa[ix] against the women’s human rights NGO Sisters in Islam (SIS), declaring the organization “deviant” for subscribing to liberalism and religious pluralism and thus deviating from Islamic teachings.[x] After 11 years, in June 2025, the Federal Court overturned the fatwa against SIS but upheld the use of term “deviant” to describe the group.[xi] The same term was also used by a Deputy Minister in February 2026 to refer to LGBT individuals.[xii] This reflects the heightened discrimination and hostility faced by LGBTQIA+ organizations such as Justice for Sisters, amidst growing conservatism surrounding LGBTQIA+ issues.[xiii] As a result, these communities experience increased fear, threats, and self-censorship.

Brunei’s legal framework explicitly criminalizes the LGBTQIA+ individuals, with laws penalizing consensual same-sex conduct and cross-dressing through imprisonment or corporal punishment.[xiv] This hostile legal environment is compounded by a severely restricted civic space that stifles freedom of expression and assembly. A key mechanism of control is the mandatory permit system for gatherings of ten or more people. In practice, the government systematically denies permits for LGBTQIA+ related events, such as a community gathering disrupted by authorities in January 2021.[xv] Consequently, activists are forced to work underground, conducting private meetings to avoid state scrutiny and the risk of prosecution.

Digital Violence and Online Harassment

Many women and LGBTQIA+ activists have used online spaces to advance their advocacy. However, they continue to face digital violence, including harassment, doxxing, non-consensual sharing of images, and coordinated abuse campaigns.

In Thailand, for instance, the former Executive Director of Amnesty International Thailand, has been subjected to online smear campaigns involving abusive gender-based language, threats of sexual violence and disinformation since the democracy protest movements in 2020.[xvi] Similar patterns have affected women human rights defenders such as Angkhana Neelapaijit and Anchana Heemmina, a Malay Muslim human rights defender. Both have been targeted by state-linked smear campaigns on the Pulony website, using manipulated images, derogatory language, sexualized rhetoric and disinformation against them[xvii]

In Malaysia, women and LGBTQIA+ activists navigating both digital and physical spheres face pervasive gender-based violence shaped by their specific social positions. Activists are targeted through a range of abusive tactics, including rape threats, death threats and other forms of online harassment. This pattern is well documented: following the 2018 Women's Day March, the Twitter hashtag #WomensMarchMY was hijacked by users who flooded participants with rape threats, body shaming, and other misogynistic comments.[xviii] 

Individual activists also face similar violence. Siti Kassim, a lawyer and activist, received online death threats, including calls for her to be beheaded, raped, and attacked with acid after an article misquoting her position on LGBTQ issues circulated online.[xix] The targeting is most severe for those who challenge dominant political, religious, or gendered hierarchies, particularly LGBTQIA+ individuals and Malay Muslim women. A study by the Pelangi Campaign found that 47% of those identifying as LGBTQ in Malaysia have experienced online harassment, with blackmail, stalking, and threats being commonplace.[xx] 

This violence does not operate in isolation from the state; activists with these intersecting identities face not only online bullying and doxxing from the public but also police summonses and legal harassment. Women's March organizers, for instance, have been repeatedly summoned and investigated under the Sedition Act and the Communications and Multimedia Act – legislation that critics have long identified as instruments of political suppression rather than public safety.[xxi]

Women journalists and activists in Indonesia have also experienced technology-facilitated gender-based violence. In 2021, a study reported that 1,077 women journalists surveyed had experienced some form of violence. Of these, around 70.1% indicated that the abuse occurred both online and offline.[xxii] The report further found that those covering issues considered “risky”, such as gender, LGBTQIA+, and the environment, were particularly targeted. 

The Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) has documented various form of digital violence faced by women journalists and activists, including doxxing, outing based on gender or sexuality, online surveillance, photo manipulation, account hacking, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. For instance, Magdalene, an Indonesian digital magazine dedicated to diversity and women's rights, has endured online harassment and experienced a severe DDoS attack that disabled its website in May 2020.[xxiii] Following such attacks, victims are often told to withdraw from social media, rather than pursues avenues to hold perpetrators accountable.[xxiv]

These case studies demonstrate that state-sanctioned and societal violence in Southeast Asia are not incidental; rather, they function as calculated tools to silence people who challenge power structures. By weaponizing fear, women and marginalized activists are forced to self-censor, resulting in the fragmentation identities and the weakening of the social networks necessary for effective dissent.

State Co-optation of Women and LGBTQIA+ activists Movements

State co-optation refers to the process by which governments absorb, reframe, or selectively incorporate women and LGBTQIA+ activists’ demands in ways that create the appearance of progress while containing their transformative potential.[xxv] Rather than suppressing movements outright, the state adopts their language, funds their less confrontational elements, or grants limited legal concessions. This approach can defuse political pressure without addressing the structural hierarchies that produced it. The result is a form of feminism that is visible enough for the state to claim credit yet constrained enough to pose no fundamental challenge to existing arrangements of race, class, religion, or sexuality. While co-optation is not always a deliberate strategy, it can also emerge from selective institutional responsiveness, where some demands gain traction because they align with state interests, while others are systematically deferred or ignored.[xxvi]

In Singapore, the state's relationship with women's and LGBTQIA+ movements can be understood as a structured form of co-optation. Civil society organizations are permitted to register and operate under the Societies Act but are required to remain “non-political” in character.[xxvii] As scholar Lenore Lyons argues, this constraint has meant that as a state-defined practice, feminism in Singapore has been unable to address issues of structural inequality and difference.[xxviii]

More recently, the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE), established in 1985 as a research and advocacy organization promoting gender equality, has been the primary feminist organization operating within this constrained civil society space. It addresses issues ranging from domestic violence to workplace discrimination while navigating the limits of state-defined legitimate advocacy.[xxix] Sayoni, a Singapore-based feminist volunteer-run organization, works to advance human rights protections for queer women including lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women.[xxx] Meanwhile Prout serves as a community platform connecting LGBTQIA+ individuals to safe spaces, events, resources, and support services.[xxxi]

A landmark success of this ecosystem was the 2023 repeal of Section 377A, a victory shaped in large part by the sustained documentation and parliamentary advocacy of groups like Sayoni.[xxxii] Yet the repeal itself illustrates the logic of co-optation. Sayoni became the first LBT organization in the Asia-Pacific to secure the inclusion of LBT issues in CEDAW's concluding observations, achieving recognition within international human rights frameworks.[xxxiii] However, the repeal was accompanied by a constitutional amendment protecting the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman,[xxxiv] ensuring that legal recognition stopped precisely where deeper structural transformation would begin.

To operate within this landscape, organizations have developed what scholars describe as a dual-track approach. AWARE, for example, has maintained a shifting, fluid, and ambivalent identity that adapts to an “over-determinist state,” translating feminist principles into reform-oriented, policy-legible language in public while preserving more structural critiques internally. The result is a feminist movement that has achieved meaningful legal gains; however, its ability to challenge the intersecting hierarchies of race, class, and sexuality remains bounded by the terms set by the state for its participation.

Resistance and Resilience

Despite the pervasive and multifaceted forms of violence intended to suppress them, women and LGBTQIA+ activists in Southeast Asia continue to demonstrate profound collective resilience. Their mobilization is dynamic and evolves in response to shifting political landscapes.[xxxv] This section explores how these feminist movements employ diverse strategies to navigate repression, including intersectional advocacy for legal reform, the reframing of public narratives, regional solidarity, and the practice of collective care.

Protest with Intersectional Demands

Democracy movements in Southeast Asia are increasingly defined by the leadership and strategic participation of feminist and LGBTQIA+ actors, who link gender justice to broader struggles against authoritarianism. Moving beyond traditional women’s rights frameworks that often-mirrored elitist or state-sponsored interests, contemporary feminist movements in the region adopt an intersectional approach that addresses the structural roots of power, securitization, and inequality. In doing so, these movements in the region expand the meaning of democracy beyond the electoral processes to include the protection of bodily autonomy and the inclusion of marginalized voices at all levels of governance.

Thailand's 2020-2021 pro-democracy protests were shaped by a broad coalition whose demands extended well beyond constitutional reform to include feminism, poverty, and education. Within this coalition, the Feminist Liberation Front (Feminist Plod Aek) played a distinctive role by asserting that gender justice was not a supplementary concern but a structural one. Feminist and LGBTQIA+ groups reinterpreted the movement's core demands to make them more inclusive. Their October 2021 “Naked Mob” protest was the most visible expression of this position: these activists called for institutional reform alongside demands for marriage equality and an end to gender-based violence, rejecting the prevailing notion that democracy should precede gender equality.[xxxvi]

Women protest leaders were also systematically targeted by state authorities and charged under laws carrying heavy prison terms for speeches delivered at peaceful demonstrations. One activist, despite being 16 years old and legally a minor, faced five legal cases, after being charged under the Emergency Decree for a speech on gender justice.[xxxvii] By refusing to silo women's issues from national political change, the Feminist Liberation Front challenged both the state's patriarchal legal foundations and the internal limitations of the movement itself.

In Singapore, the state has strategically legalized limited protest to manage political tensions; however, strict regulations including mandatory identification checks, geographic confinement to Speakers' Corner at Hong Lim Park, and bans on foreign participation persist as mechanisms of containment. Hong Lim Park remains the only legal protest site in the country of 5.7 million,[xxxviii] making it both a concession and a constraint.

Despite these limitations, Pink Dot SG, an annual pride gathering held since 2009, in which participants form a visible "pink dot" in support of LGBTQIA+ inclusion[xxxix] and the freedom to love has evolved into one of Singapore's most significant sites of civil society convergence. While centered on LGBTQIA+ equality, the rally has become a rare platform for a broader coalition such as the Transformative Justice Collective, which advocates for prison abolition and criminal justice reform, has spoken from the Pink Dot soapbox alongside groups campaigning for transgender healthcare, queer Muslim spaces, and the legal challenge to Section 377A.[xl]

The functional purpose of this convergence extends beyond visibility. By co-locating under the Pink Dot umbrella, groups like Migrant Mutual Aid[xli] and SG Climate Rally[xlii] gain access to a large, politically engaged audience, amplifying issues that face even greater barriers to public organizing than LGBTQIA+ rights. Organizations working on sex workers' rights, such as Project X,[xliii] have also used the community tent to build broader recognition through sustained engagement, helping to normalize their claims within a wider progressive coalition. In this way, marginalized groups leverage a state-sanctioned space not only to gain visibility, but also to build connections, fostering the cross-issue relationships that Singapore's tightly regulated public sphere would otherwise inhibit.

Policy and Legal Advocacy

In Malaysia, women hold only 13.5% of seats in the House of Representatives, falling short of the target of 30% representation in politics.[xliv] This significant gender disparity in formal political institutions has made grassroots activism a pivotal alternative avenue for change.[xlv] The Joint Action Group for Gender Equality has successfully spearheaded major legal reforms, including key amendments to the Domestic Violence Act and advocacy for constitutional gender equality.[xlvi] However, these successes have often been achieved through institutionalized bureaucratic procedures and legal channels rather than direct, disruptive political engagement. This reliance on the institutional pathways reflects a strategic adaptation to a political system that remains largely inaccessible to women and marginalized groups.

Reframing Narratives

Women’s rights organizations in Brunei operate within a “partners in progress” framework, positioning their work as supportive of, rather than oppositional to, state functions.[xlvii] By collaborating with the government, groups such as Single Mama Speaks and Project Women Brunei utilize strategic language, such as economic empowerment and community development to build public support for gender equality.[xlviii]

For instance, Single Mama Speaks functions as a peer support network for single mothers. It organizes talks, forums and educational events, often in collaboration with government entities or NGOs.[xlix] Similarly, Project Women Brunei empowers women through legal advice and advocating on domestic violence issues through both in-person and online events.[l] This approach allows organizations to address sensitive issues while maintaining a non-confrontational public profile. This soft advocacy model relies on positive, empowering messaging to navigate a highly restricted political environment, ensuring that gender advancement is framed as a contribution to national stability and prosperity.[li]

Regional Solidarity 

As domestic barriers stifle local advocacy, regional solidarity serves as a critical lifeline, providing access to funding, legal expertise, and opportunities for cross-border learning. This transnational support is exemplified by Brunei's LGBTQIA+ community, which has historically relied on Singapore-based organizations to advance gender justice in a context where local organizing is severely constrained.

A key mechanism through which this operates is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the principal international human rights treaty on gender equality. It requires signatory states to submit periodic reports to a UN committee and allows civil society organizations to submit parallel “shadow reports” that document gaps between government claims and lived realities.[lii] 

All 11 ASEAN member states have ratified CEDAW,[liii] but ratification does not necessarily indicate full commitment. Only three countries in the region — Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei have entered reservations to the treaty's substantive provisions, each citing conflicts with Islamic or personal laws.[liv] These reservations are significant: Singapore has reserved Article 2, which outlines core state obligations to implement gender equality, while Malaysia and Brunei have both reserved Article 16 concerning equality in marriage and family relations.[lv] Where states exempt themselves from these obligations, civil society faces significant limitations in holding them accountable. 

It is within this constrained landscape that a pivotal moment of regional interdependence emerged during the CEDAW shadow reporting cycle between 2008 and 2011. During this period, Sayoni, a Singaporean feminist organization focused on the rights of queer women, found that LGBTQIA+ concerns were being relegated to an appendix by other local women's organizations coordinating the shadow report.

Rather than accept this marginalization, Sayoni submitted its own report, ensuring that the experiences of lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women were presented directly to the UN Committee.[lvi] This incident reveals a broader dynamic in which mainstream women's organizations may fail to fully represent the most marginalized within their own movements, highlighting the importance of regional women and LGBTQIA+ activists networks become essential in ensuring that these voices reach international accountability mechanisms. 

These regional groups primarily operate through network-based structures including the Asia Feminist LBQ Network (AFLN), the Asia Pacific Transgender Network (APTN), the Asia Pacific Network of Sex Workers (APNSW), the Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD), the Asian Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA Asia), the ASEAN SOGIE Caucus, and the Asia Pacific Alliance for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (APA). Others function as regional resource or advocacy centers with specific mission, such as the Asian-Pacific Resource and Research Centre for Women (ARROW) and International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (IWRAW). Among these nine organizations, five are based in Thailand, two in Malaysia, one in the Philippines, and one in an undisclosed location.

Collective Care and Funding Constraints

Beyond external state repression, women and LGBTQIA+ human rights defenders in Southeast Asia navigate profound mental and emotional cost. Sustained activism under such conditions often results in systemic trauma, structural burnout, and fatigue, compounded by the social stigma of challenging entrenched legal and cultural norms. Furthermore, the persistence of patriarchal structures within some activist spaces can lead to internal exclusion, further marginalizing specific groups, and rendering their contributions invisible. Without a robust framework of mutual support and collective care, these intersecting pressures threaten to deplete the vital energy of these movements from within.

Collective care shifts the burden of well-being from the individual to the movement, asserting that the physical and mental health of activists is a shared institutional responsibility.[lvii] More than just a support system, it is an intentional act of political recognition and affirmation. By centering care, movements acknowledge that well-being is not a luxury but a political strategy necessary to sustain activists’ health. When activists are well, they are better equipped to maintain the longevity and impact of their advocacy over time.[lviii]

In Thailand, organizations such as Backyard Politics and Feminist Friend Meeting have created intentional collective care spaces for the well-being of women and LGBTQI+ individuals and activists. At the regional level, networks such as the Asia Feminist LBQ Network (AFLN) have worked to build collective care infrastructure beyond the national level. AFLN creates spaces where LBQ activists can learn, strategize, and build community. It also supports the distribution of funding to local groups and amplifies the experiences of lesbians, bisexuals, and queer individuals who face distinct challenges.[lix]

Conclusion

Violence against women and LGBTQIA+ human rights defenders in Southeast Asia is deeply systemic rather than incidental. Across the region, states weaponize a sophisticated array of legal mechanisms, discriminatory statutes, and digital surveillance to systematically shrink civic space and neutralize dissent. Activists navigate a landscape of harassment, arbitrary imprisonment, and social stigma. Crucially, their intersecting identities - such as ethnicity, religion, class, and sexuality - shape both the specific forms of state repression they encounter and the unique strategies they deploy in response.

Despite systemic repression, resistance in Southeast Asia persists through tactical innovation. Movements are evolving through intersectional protest, strategic narrative reframing, and robust regional solidarity networks. Central to this evolution is the integration of collective care, grounded in the understanding that sustaining the activist is a prerequisite for sustaining the movement. This shift necessitates a move beyond traditional, program-based output metrics to a holistic, sustainable model of resistance.

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Femnimitr is a collective of passionate, data-driven people consisting of development practitioners and independent researchers across the Majority World. Over the past five years, in addition to operating the Gender Knowledge Hub, Femnimitr has worked with policymakers, development practitioners, and feminist activists to produce research with robust, intersectional gender data across Southeast Asia.

Disclaimer: This published work was prepared with the support of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung. The views and analysis contained in the work are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the foundation. The author is responsible for any liability claims against copyright breaches of graphics, photograph, images, audio, and text used. 


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[iii] Bong, S. A. (2016). Women’s and Feminist Activism in Southeast Asia. In M. Derichs & A. Fleschenberg (Eds.), Women’s Movements and the State in Asia. Routledge.

[iv] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (22 September 2023). Lao PDR: UN expert calls out alarming pattern of violations against human rights defendershttps://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/09/lao-pdr-un-expert-calls-out-alarming-pattern-violations-against-human-rights

[v] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (23 June 2017). UN human rights office concerned harsh sentencing three activists in Lao PDR. https://bangkok.ohchr.org/news/2017/news-release-un-human-rights-office-concerned-harsh-sentencing-three-activists-lao-pdr

[vi] FIDH & Lao Movement for Human Rights (LMHR). (16 May 2017). Three government critics jailed for up to 20 years. https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/laos/three-government-critics-jailed-for-up-to-20-years

[vii] Manushya Foundation. (13 September 2023). #FreeMuay: 4 Years Behind Bars. https://www.manushyafoundation.org/post/freemuay-4-years-behind-bars

[viii] Izharuddin, A. (17 August 2013). Malaysian feminist activism as an effect of history. New Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/malaysian-feminist-activism-as-an-effect-of-history/.

[ix]Fatwa, in Islamic jurisprudence, a formal ruling or authoritative interpretation on a point of Islamic law given by a qualified legal scholar (known as a mufti) on practical matters of life, such as diet, finance, or family matters. Britanica. (29 May 2026). Fatwa. https://www.britannica.com/topic/fatwa. 

[x] Article 19. (19 June 2025). Malaysia: Federal Court Rules in Favour of Women Human Rights Defenders.https://www.article19.org/resources/malaysia-federal-court-rules-in-favour-of-women-human-rights-defenders/;  Sisters in Islam. (31 October 2014). SIS Challenges Fatwa on Liberalism and Pluralism. https://sistersinislam.org/sis-challenges-fatwa-on-liberalism-and-pluralism/

[xi] Article 19. (19 June 2025). Malaysia: Federal Court Rules in Favour of Women Human Rights Defenders.https://www.article19.org/resources/malaysia-federal-court-rules-in-favour-of-women-human-rights-defenders/

[xii] Amnesty International Malaysia. (27 February 2026). Reckless Labeling of LGBTI People as “Deviant” Fuels Hate and Discrimination. https://www.amnesty.my/2026/02/27/reckless-labeling-of-lgbti-people-as-deviant-fuels-hate-and-discrimination/

[xiii] Human Rights Watch & Justice for Sisters. (10 August 2022). “I Don't Want to Change Myself” Anti-LGBT Conversion Practices, Discrimination, and Violence in Malaysia. Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/08/10/i-dont-want-change-myself/anti-lgbt-conversion-practices-discrimination-and.

[xiv] Human Rights Watch. (22 May 2019). Brunei's Pernicious New Penal Code. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/22/bruneis-pernicious-new-penal-code

[xv] U.S. Department of State. (2021). 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Brunei. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/brunei/

[xvi] Amnesty International. (7 April 2025). Thailand: Authorities must end malicious smear campaigns and cyberattacks on civil society. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/04/thailand-authorities-must-end-malicious-smear-campaigns-and-cyberattacks-on-civil-society/

[xvii] The UN Special Rapporteurs. (18 August 2023). Letter concerning the lack of accountability and protection measures for the online intimidation and harassment against two women human rights defenders, Ms. Angkhana Neelapaijit and Ms. Anchana Heemmina. AL THA 3/2023; Amnesty International. (16 May 2024). “Being Ourselves is Too Dangerous” Digital Violence and the Silencing of Women and LGBTI Activists in Thailand. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa39/7955/2024/en/

[xviii] Women's Learning Partnership. (28 March 2018). WLP Malaysia denounces harassment at Women's Rights March. https://learningpartnership.org/blog/wlp-malaysia-denounces-harassment-womens-rights-march 

[xix] Front Line Defenders. (24 July 2017). Siti Kasim receives death, rape and acid attack threats. https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/siti-kasim-receives-death-rape-and-acid-attack-threats

[xx] PELANGI Campaign. (12 June 2018). Internet and sexuality: LGBTQ experience in Malaysia. Medium. https://medium.com/@pelangicampaign/internet-and-sexuality-lgbtq-experience-in-malaysia-a895497f3a35.

[xxi] Aminudin, R. (25 June 2024). Malaysian women in a digital fight for rights. Malay Mail. https://www.malaymail.com/news/what-you-think/2024/06/25/malaysian-women-in-a-digital-fight-for-rights-rabiah-aminudin/141325.

[xxii] PR2Media. (March 2022). Violence Against Female Journalists in Indonesiahttps://pr2media.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Violence-Against-Female-Journalists-In-Indonesia.pdf

[xxiii] Advancing Voices of Expression (Advox), Global Voices. (15 November 2025). Five Years of Fighting: The State of Digital Violence Against Female Journalists and Activists in Indonesia. https://advox.globalvoices.org/2025/11/15/five-years-of-fighting-the-state-of-digital-violence-against-female-journalists-and-activists-in-indonesia/.

[xxiv] Ibid. 

[xxv] De Jong, S. & Kimm, S. (2017). The co-optation of feminisms: a research agenda. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 19(2), 185–200. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2017.1299582.

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Lyons, L. (2000). The Limits of Feminist Political Intervention in Singapore. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 30(1), 67–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472330080000051.

[xxviii] Ibid. 

[xxix] AWARE Singapore. (n.d.). AWARE Singaporehttps://www.aware.org.sg/.

[xxx] Sayoni. (n.d.). Sayonihttps://www.sayoni.com/.

[xxxi] Anisa, M. (8 June 2024). How Prout aims to help LGBTQ community in Singapore with its new app. e27. https://e27.co/how-prout-aims-to-help-lgbtq-community-in-singapore-with-its-new-app-20230607/.

[xxxii] International Commission of Jurists. (28 November 2022). Singapore: Long overdue decriminalization of consensual same-sex relations between men overshadowed by discriminatory constitutional amendment purporting to “protect” definition of marriagehttps://www.icj.org/singapore-long-overdue-decriminalization-of-consensual-same-sex-relations-between-men-overshadowed-by-discriminatory-constitutional-amendment-purporting-to-protect-definition-of-mar/.

[xxxiii] The Singapore LGBT encyclopedia Wiki. (n.d.). Sayoni's contributions to CEDAWhttps://the-singapore-lgbt-encyclopaedia.fandom.com/wiki/Sayoni%27s_contributions_to_CEDAW.

[xxxiv] Leo, L. (28 November 2022). Timeline: Repealing Section 377A and amending the Constitution to protect the definition of marriageCNA. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/timeline-repealing-377a-gay-sex-law-amending-singapore-constitution-marriage-definition-3101551.

[xxxv] Bong, A. (2016). Women’s and Feminist Activism in Southeast Asia. Routledge.

[xxxvi] Rakwongrit, N. (10 September 2024). Defiance and determination: A feminist activist's journey in Thailand. Minds of the Movement.https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/defiance-and-determination-a-feminist-activists-journey-in-thailand/

[xxxvii] Prachatai. (4 July 2021). A young activist's fight for gender equality and democracy in Thailand. Global Voices. https://globalvoices.org/2021/07/04/a-young-activists-fight-for-gender-equality-and-democracy-in-thailand/

[xxxviii] National Library Board. (2020). Civil society. Infopedia. https://www.nlb.gov.sg/main/article-detail?cmsuuid=f865fe16-e413-40ba-9883-a7df3628d04b

[xxxix] Pink Dot SG. (n.d.). Pink Dot SGhttps://pinkdot.sg/.

[xl] Pink Dot SG. (18 June 2022). Pink Dot 14: Onward to a more inclusive Singaporehttps://pinkdot.sg/2022/06/pink-dot-14-onward-to-a-more-inclusive-singapore/.

[xli] Migrant Mutual Aid. (n.d.). Migrant Mutual Aid. https://migrantmutualaid.sg/.

[xlii] SG Climate Rally. (n.d.). SG Climate Rallyhttps://www.sgclimaterally.com/.

[xliii] Project X. (n.d.). About Project Xhttps://theprojectx.org/.

[xliv] Yeong, J. (10 October 2025). Counting candidates: Towards minimum 30% women representation on the ballot. Penang Institute. https://penanginstitute.org/publications/issues/counting-candidates-towards-minimum-30-women-representation-on-the-ballot/

[xlv] Wan Azizah, I. (2002). Women in Politics: Reflections from Malaysia. In Cultural Barriers to Women’s Political Participation. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68127-2_624-1.

[xlvi] Heinrich Böll Stiftung. (2024). Feminist movements in Southeast Asia: Scoping research. P.20.

[xlvii]Ahmad, N., Ibrahim, H. and Muhammad, N. (2022). Women’s empowerment in Brunei Darussalam in O. K. Gin and V. T. King, Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Brunei. Routledge, pp. 327–340. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003020431-27.

[xlviii]Ahmad, N. and Hamdani, N. (2024). Women’s civic engagement and advocacy for victims of domestic violence in Brunei. International Journal for Studies on Children, Women, Elderly and Disabled, 20, pp. 124–133.

[xlix] Ibid.

[l] Ahmad, N., Ibrahim, H. and Muhammad, N. (2022). Women’s empowerment in Brunei Darussalam in O. K. Gin and V. T. King, Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Brunei. Routledge, pp. 327–340. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003020431-27.

[li] Ahmad, N. and Hamdani, N. (2024). Women’s civic engagement and advocacy for victims of domestic violence in Brunei. International Journal for Studies on Children, Women, Elderly and Disabled, 20, pp. 124–133.

[lii] The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. (n.d.). Statement by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on its relationship with non-governmental organizations. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/Statements/NGO.pdf.

[liii] UN Women Asia and the Pacific. (n.d.). Frequently asked questions (FAQ) about CEDAWhttps://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/focus-areas/cedaw-human-rights/faq 

[liv] United Nations Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Retrieved May 24, 2026, from https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-8&chapter=4

[lv] Ibid. 

[lvi] Sayoni, & Asia Feminist LBQ Network. (October 2025). Joint stakeholder submission by: Sayoni, Asia Feminist LBQ Network (AFLN) - Singapore [Submission to the 52nd Session of the UPR Working Group]. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=16292&file=EnglishTranslation

[lvii] Social Development Direct. (27 February 2024). Tip Sheet: Collective Care. https://www.sddirect.org.uk/resource/tip-sheet-collective-care

[lviii] Ilyas, M. & Cordero, T. (2017). Collective Care in Human Rights Funding: A Political Stand. OpenGlobalRights. https://www.openglobalrights.org/collective-care-in-human-rights-funding-poli/

[lix] GiveOut. (2025). Unveiling Invisibility with Jean Chong and the Asia Feminist LBQ Networkhttps://giveout.org/unveiling-invisibility-with-jean-chong-and-the-asia-feminist-lbq-network/